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Key Points
 • Understanding the impacts of SDG 16 on forests and people requires 
attention to the power dynamics that shape how all 17 SDGs are 
interpreted and implemented across the Global North and South.
 • As SDGs were agreed upon by nation states, SDG 16 places a strong 
emphasis on state power and the rule of law.
 • Yet inclusive governance requires the involvement of diverse actors, and 
consideration for customary laws and other non-state forms of rule-
making at global to local scales.
 • Many national laws governing forests and land use favour political elite, 
large-scale industry actors and international trade.
 • The development and strengthening of legal frameworks that support 
all of the SDGs – including those relevant to human rights, income 
inequalities, land tenure, gender and environmental protection – 
requires equal or greater priority than law enforcement. Otherwise, law 
enforcement will reinforce inequities and unsustainable practices.
 • SDG 16 provides an opportunity to overcome the stereotypes of the 
Global North as the referential role model for peace and democracy, by 
highlighting the role of the North in fostering market inequalities and 
global conflicts, and drawing attention to barriers to democratic and 
inclusive participation within the Global North.
 • How transparency, accountability and justice are conceived and 
prioritised shapes their impact on forests, as well as the degree to which 
their achievement either empowers forest-dependent peoples or excludes 
them from meaningful and informed engagement.
* Lead author.
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16.1 Introduction
SDG 16 highlights core principles of governance relevant to the design and 
implementation of all 17 SDGs. Yet despite the seemingly universal appeal of 
principles such as ‘peace’ and ‘justice’, negotiations over SDG 16 were heavily 
contested, revealing a complex geopolitical landscape of competing interna-
tional priorities (Slotin and Elgin-Cossart 2013). Developing countries have 
raised concerns that the SDGs might be hi-jacked by the UN’s peace and secu-
rity agenda, perceived as prioritising securitisation while ignoring the links 
between peace and broader goals such as social equity, climate change mitiga-
tion and development (Slotin and Elgin-Cossart 2013). These political battles 
help to explain the arguably mixed messages embedded in SDG 16’s 12 tar-
gets (see Table 16.1). While some targets on inclusiveness and justice suggest 
a pluralist and ‘bottom up’ approach to governance, many other targets are 
consistent with Westphalian notions of a strong state1 reliant on legal for-
malisation, and legitimised through representative democracy. The goal’s 23 
indicators reinforce this emphasis on the state, and are backed by extensive 
demands for quantitative and qualitative data.
The implications of implementing SDG 16 for forests and forest-dependent 
peoples depend on how the principles, targets and indicators are interpreted, 
prioritised, monitored and reported. Implementation may vary, for exam-
ple, according to whether emphasis is placed on (1) a strong and centralised 
nation state and the enforcement of state laws and regulations or (2) a more 
pluralistic or decentralised notion of good governance where power is distrib-
uted across scales and institutions, and authority exercised by states, market-
based initiatives and/or ground-up, locally driven processes. Likewise, it will 
depend on whether states internalise their own visions and commitments to 
good governance, or whether most of their efforts focus on gathering data 
and reporting on the 23 more narrowly defined indicators.
The importance of interpretation reflects the socially constructed nature 
of core governance concepts such as ‘justice’ and ‘accountability’, and differ-
ing perceptions of the legitimacy and appropriateness of formal versus infor-
mal governance, and state-based, market-based and customary institutions. 
Hence, while the SDGs may represent international consensus on overarch-
ing principles of good governance, in practice their implementation will be 
strongly influenced by the political priorities and power dynamics that con-
tinue to unfold at global to local scales. This, in turn, will hold different 
implications for forests and people in different country contexts.
1 The 1648 treaties of Westphalia were instrumental in enshrining the sovereignty and 
authority of nation states in international law. See, for example, Cutler 2001: 1024.
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This chapter outlines these complexities and identifies key challenges, 
opportunities and trade-offs in implementing SDG 16 in a way that is good for 
forests and people across very different environmental, social and economic 
contexts. Section 16.2 examines how three inter-related themes articulated in 
the SDG 16 text intersect with trends in forest governance: (1) peace and the 
reduction of armed conflict; (2) rule of law, accountability, transparency and 
access to justice; (3) inclusiveness and participation. These themes are dis-
cussed in a general sense, and then case studies illustrate key challenges and 
trade-offs. Section 16.3 synthesises lessons learned on how context shapes 
the impacts of SDG 16 implementation, and the implications for promoting 
Table 16.1 SDG 16 targets
16.1  Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates 
everywhere
16.2  End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and 
torture of children
16.3  Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and 
ensure equal access to justice for all
16.4  By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen 
the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of 
organized crime
16.5 Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms
16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels
16.7  Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-
making at all levels
16.8  Broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the 
institutions of global governance
16.9 By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration
16.10  Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, 
in accordance with national legislation and international agreements
16.A  Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international 
cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing 
countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime
16.B  Promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable 
development
Source: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg16
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inclusive and environmentally effective governance. This conclusion speaks 
to the two ‘operationalising targets’ of SDG 16 (16A and 16B), focused on 
institutions and non-discriminatory laws and policies.
Consistent with several other authors in this book, we are less concerned 
with hypothetical discussions of what it would mean to achieve the ends of 
universal peace, justice and strong institutions, and more focused on the 
importance of the means by which states responsible for SDG implementa-
tion attempt to achieve these, and how this shapes outcomes. This allows for 
a more critical, ‘political ecology’ perspective to unpack how power dynam-
ics shape human-nature interactions and their outcomes. Such an approach 
recognises the power dynamics inherent in the design and implementation 
of the SDGs, and the dynamic and contested nature of governance. It high-
lights how the SDGs are a product of a particular UN process, agreed on by 
national governments and interpreted and used in the context of interna-
tional processes, including bi-lateral and multi-lateral finance. This could in 
part explain the strong implied focus within SDG 16 on state-associated insti-
tutions, with much reference to laws, legal enforcement, legal recognition, 
public officials and other state-centric language. It also sparks broader ques-
tions about the relative roles of the Global North and South in deciding how 
peace and justice are defined and operationalised within the SDGs.
16.2 Governance under SDG 16
The term ‘governance’ has gained increasing traction over the last few dec-
ades, reflecting changes in the locus and nature of power and authority under 
globalisation (Rosenau 1995). Global economic growth and the expansion of 
international trade have generated new challenges – from deforestation and 
climate change to social inequalities and civil unrest– that have catalysed 
new forms of social coordination at multiple scales, involving diverse state, 
private and civil society actors (Castells 2008, Gunningham 2009).
In this context, ‘governance’ may be broadly defined as ‘the formation 
and stewardship of the formal and informal rules that regulate the pub-
lic realm, the arena in which state as well as economic and societal actors 
interact to make decisions’ (Hyden et al. 2004: 16). With specific reference 
to natural resources, Campese (2016: 7) defines natural resource govern-
ance as ‘the norms, institutions, and processes that determine how power 
and responsibilities over natural resources are exercised, how decisions are 
taken and how citizens – including women, men, youth, Indigenous peoples 
and local communities – secure access to, participate in, and are impacted by 
the management of natural resources’. Such an understanding reveals how 
the governance of ‘sustainable development’ and associated norms within 
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international policy instruments such as the SDGs is not simply a techni-
cal challenge involving state actors implementing universally agreed-upon 
norms; it is an inherently political process involving contestations over who 
should govern what and for whom (Ferguson 1994).
The globalisation of social and economic relations and the territorial expan-
sion of commercial agriculture and extractive industries, along with associ-
ated information technologies and telecommunications, have fostered the 
expansion of inter-governmental agreements, market-based instruments such 
as sustainability certification, and multi-stakeholder platforms, all of which 
interact in complex ways with existing state, local and/or traditional sources 
of formal and informal authority. The resulting power dynamics are often 
unequal, with the ‘resource-strong’ – donors, private entities or governments, 
often external to the sites of implementation – dictating the terms of trade 
and creating new governance structures impacting local decision-making. 
This has spurred conflicts over the appropriate nature and scale of authority, 
and the relative legitimacy of various institutions to govern d ecision-making 
(Bodansky 1999).
The following examination of three themes under SDG 16 will be viewed 
within this context. In each case we consider the literature on their relation 
to forests and livelihoods, relevant governance trends, and implications for 
the implementation of SDG 16 and the SDGs more generally.
16.2.1 Peace and the Reduction of Violence and Armed 
Conflict
SDG 16 covers all forms of violence and abuse, at multiple scales, both organ-
ised and un-organised. The strongest emphasis is on physical violence, but 
psychological violence is also mentioned (Indicator 16.1.3). The literature 
addressing the impacts of violence on forests and forest-dependent peoples 
falls into one of two relatively narrow categories: violence against civilians 
directly related to land and resource conflicts; and indirect impacts on forests 
and local communities from armed conflicts, such as political rebellion or 
organised crime.
Most of this literature focuses more on the ends than the means: how 
conflict does or does not impact forests and people, rather than on how the 
purpose of the conflict, or how it is suppressed, influences resulting impacts. 
This is perhaps congruent with a dominant discourse that peace is the natu-
ral outcome of the rule of law and democratic participation. Yet, as observed 
by Paret (2015: 107), the reality is much more complex: ‘violent practices 
may become tools of liberation, promoting democracy by empowering mar-
ginalized groups … [or] … democracy may become a tool of domination, 
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undermining dissent by constituting as violent those persons and actions 
that deviate from formal institutional channels’.
The realisation of SDG 16 requires that citizens be free to defend their land 
and resource rights and to engage in environmental advocacy in a nonviolent 
manner and without fear of intimidation or reprisal. A growing body of evi-
dence suggests this is currently not the case across many regions worldwide. 
The NGO Global Witness has developed a database of murders of ‘environ-
mental defenders’: activists or local populations engaged in defending land 
or natural resources. According to this database, an estimated global average 
of four environmental defenders are murdered every week (Global Witness 
2017). For 2016 and 2017, 16 per cent of these murders were associated with 
logging and a further 20 per cent with wildlife poaching, often linked to for-
ested areas. These rates are believed to be significantly under-reported, par-
ticularly in countries with limited free press, and they exclude much larger 
numbers of people who are injured, threatened, intimidated or criminalised.
In the broader literature on organised armed conflict, Melander et al. 
(2016) identify several types: (1) state-based armed conflict, involving at 
least one government actor; (2) non-state conflicts between rebel groups and 
militias and (3) one-sided killing of unarmed civilians, by states or formally 
organised non-state groups. Following World War II, the largest number of 
deaths are attributed to internal, state-based armed conflict, along with a 
recent rapid rise in ‘internationalised’ (internationally supported) intra-state 
conflict (especially within Syria, where state actors also play a significant role) 
(Melander et al. 2016). Of significance here, state governments are tasked 
with SDG implementation when they themselves are sometimes the lead-
ing perpetrators of violence. Furthermore, as highlighted by Scott(1998) and 
Rudel et al. (2009), state actors have historically encouraged the settlement 
and clearance of forest frontiers as a strategy to solidify their control over 
rural populations or territories.
Concerning the underlying drivers of armed conflict, Collier and Hoeffler 
(2000) distinguish between ‘grievance’, which relates to the acuteness of the 
professed cause of conflict, and ‘greed’, denoting the presence of political and 
economic opportunity. Donovan et al. (2007) and de Koning et al. (2008), 
looking specifically at forest and conflict linkages, argue for the importance 
of both grievance and greed in driving conflict and associated forest change. 
They highlight how people living in or near forests are in many parts of the 
world at the margins of state support and services. For instance, de Koning 
(2007) finds that political and economic inequalities were the underlying 
causes of several of the civil wars that were taking place in West Africa’s for-
ests during the first decade of the twenty-first century. Armed conflicts them-
selves exacerbate causes for grievance because of their negative impact on 
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human capital, especially in rural settings – including forest-dependent com-
munities (Chamarbagwala and Morain 2011). However, other contemporary 
conflict researchers argue that grievance and greed are more correlates of con-
flict than its drivers, and variously emphasise the causal roles of weak and 
illegitimate state institutions (e.g. Fearon 2011) or sectarian inequalities (e.g. 
Stewart 2009).
International actors and large-scale industry also play a role in forest con-
flict, for example when agricultural and mining firms compete with local 
communities for land and resources. At the same time, the rise of interna-
tional governance aimed at forest conservation and reducing forest emissions 
(themes of SDG 15 and SDG 13, respectively) involves yet another competing 
set of interests in the forest frontier, focused on carbon, biodiversity and con-
servation (Fairhead et al. 2012, Kaag and Zoomers 2014, Scheidel and Work 
2018).
The international emphasis on conservation has, in some cases, led to 
‘green militarisation’ or the use of military or paramilitary personnel or tech-
niques to protect national parks and limit poaching of wildlife (see Lunstrum 
2014). Büscher and Ramutsindela (2015) write of ‘green violence’, which 
expands the concept of green militarisation to include broader concepts of 
violence, both material and non-material, and encompassing discursive and 
social violence used to promote environmental protection. Green violence 
includes forced removal of local people from parks, killing of poachers and 
discourse in favour of such killings (Büscher and Ramutsindela 2015). In some 
cases, ‘shoot-on-sight’ policies have been advocated (Messer 2010).
Whatever the causes of violent conflict, its impacts on forests are variable. 
In terms of biodiversity, the literature reports both negative (Gaynor et al. 
2016, Ordway 2015) and positive impacts, the latter largely because the pres-
ence of conflict discourages forest access (Álvarez 2003, Burgess et al. 2015, 
Harwell 2010, McNeely 2003). Forest impacts may increase when the con-
flict dissipates (Blom and Yamindou 2001) as priority is placed on generating 
peace dividends, including construction and the resettlement of ex-combat-
ants. Demand for wood and agricultural land may surge during post-conflict 
years (Harwell 2010). Additionally, negative impacts on forest governance 
linger, through the limited effectiveness of public administration and poor 
implementation of forest and nature policies (Staver et al. 2007).
Likewise, conflict has variable effects on forest-dependent communities. 
Armed conflicts in forest regions often involve interventions by government 
forces or their allies, which reduces community access to forests, or diminishes 
the availability of resources (Álvarez 2003, Harwell 2010). Insurgent groups 
impose demands on communities for food, forest products and other goods 
and services (Harwell 2010). Under armed conflict conditions, land grabbing is 
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more readily condoned, resulting in communities losing access to forests and 
their goods and services. Displaced groups, especially refugees, turn to forests 
when other livelihood sources have almost evaporated or livelihoods need to 
be rebuilt. In such contexts, international sanctions imposed on so-called con-
flict timber can undermine local economic welfare (Price et al. 2007).
Two reviews on conflict timber (de Jong et al. 2007, Price 2003) synthesise 
findings across numerous cases of armed conflicts involving forests and for-
est peoples worldwide, including the two countries we explore in our case 
studies: Colombia and Peru. Many of these cases are classified as civil wars, 
although for each the nature of the conflict varied. In all case countries, 
except perhaps the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Colombia, 
the organised armed conflicts have stopped or have transformed into other 
types of conflict. Many regions remain unstable, characterised by violence, 
low compliance with state law and ineffective state governments. In Peru 
and Colombia remnants of insurgence groups continue as organised crime 
(Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015). In the coming decades, it is possible that 
organised crime will dominate forest-based armed conflicts, as has happened 
in Peru and Colombia where Mexican drug cartels have taken over from 
insurgence groups. This has negative consequences for local people’s well-
being, although not necessarily for their incomes.
These findings highlight how the challenge of reducing violence and armed 
conflict must be viewed in the broader context of multi-scale governance and 
environmental and social welfare. A reliance on state actors to quell violence 
and promote peace could, in some contexts, have negative environmental 
and social outcomes (UN 2015), including the conversion of forest frontiers 
to commercial land use as a means to exert state control, and the repression 
of political dissent (Scott 1998).
CASE STUDY 16.1 PEACEBUILDING IN COLOMBIA AND PERU
Both Colombia and Peru have undergone extended periods of armed conflict 
with widespread implications for forest cover and the livelihoods of forest-
dependent people. In Peru, the Maoist group the Shining Path concentrated 
their activities in the highlands and the capital city of Lima from the 1980s to 
the 1990s. The conflicts and instability linked to the violence led to internally 
displace people (IDPs) (estimates range from 310 000 to 600 000), many of 
whom migrated either to Lima or to forested areas in the Peruvian Amazon. 
Population growth in the Peruvian Amazon, and subsequent deforestation, is 
often attributed to this displacement (Ravikumar et al. 2017).
In Colombia, a 2016 peace agreement ended more than 60 years of armed 
conflict led by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which 
concentrated much of its activities in the Amazonian region. As of 2014, 
there were 5.8 million IDPs in Colombia (Hojen 2015), with some displaced 
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as a direct result of the armed conflict, and others due to drug trade and other 
conflicts.
In both countries, the conflicts were linked to inequality and calls for land 
reforms. Insecurity of land tenure has been shown to have a negative impact 
on forest cover in conflict areas in Colombia (Dávalos 2001). Castro-Nuñez 
et al. (2017a) find further evidence for the importance of unequal land distri-
bution and land grabbing in the conflict, as well as evidence that the presence 
of forest commons was associated with lower rates of conflict.
Timber may serve as an important means to finance armed conflicts (Castro-
Nuñez et al. 2017a), particularly in forest frontier areas where there is little 
state presence and a high concentration of commercially valuable species. It 
is important to note, however, that the presence of forest cover is itself not an 
indicator of the presence of armed conflict (Harwell 2010, Rustad et al. 2008).
Regarding the net effect of conflict on forests in Colombia and Peru, sev-
eral main effects have been observed. In both countries, there have been cases 
of ‘gunpoint conservation’ where productive activities are curtailed by the 
violence or enforcement of curfews (Dávalos 2001). There has also been pres-
sure on forest lands due to cultivation of illicit crops (coca) in regions where 
armed conflicts exclude the presence of law enforcement (Castro-Nuñez 
et al. 2017a). In Colombia, armed groups actively conserved forest cover as a 
means to avoid surveillance (McNeely 2003). In Peru, some regions saw dis-
placement to areas with high forest cover in search of safer, more stable living 
environments (Shanee and Shanee 2016).
Importantly, the impact of armed conflict on forests is not always consist-
ent at national or regional levels. In some cases in Colombia, the FARC used 
forests as cover for covert operations and/or funded their activities by selling 
forest resources, thereby maintaining forest cover but contributing to forest 
degradation (Álvarez 2003). In contrast, in the San Lucas mountain range, 
the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN) actively enforced bans 
on hunting and logging, thereby protecting some forests from degradation 
(Dávalos 2001). In cases where the local populations chose to remain, the 
conflicts significantly impacted land-use and livelihood strategies, thereby 
influencing forest cover. In other regions, the FARC and the Shining Path 
encouraged coca cultivation, leading to deforestation (Álvarez 2003). While 
the FARC were actively promoting coca cultivation, the ELN supported coca 
eradication and instead promoted mining, which also had negative impacts 
on forested lands (Dávalos 2001). In areas with gold or lands appropriate 
for cattle, Sánchez-Cuervo and Aide (2013) find that the presence of armed 
groups decreased forest cover.
The effect of migration on forests also varies. In the case of Peru, conflict led 
to migration to cities and to regions of the Amazon with high forest cover. In 
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Colombia, where conflict areas were often in regions with high forest cover, 
migration did not have such a clear impact on forests at the regional scale.
These examples highlight the importance of (1) the particularities of the 
armed group’s activities (e.g. FARC sometimes used forests for cover and 
other times promoted deforestation for coca cultivation) and (2) the con-
flict’s location relative to areas of high forest cover (e.g. Peru’s conflicts in 
low-forest areas led to migration to forested areas, whereas the reverse is true 
for Colombia).
While Peru has had almost two decades of peace, Colombia has only 
recently begun the peacebuilding process. It is important to distinguish 
between measures that lead to decreases in direct violence (e.g. institutions 
that limit violence) and those that address the structural drivers of violence 
(e.g. securing land tenure as a means to address land conflict). Colombia 
and Peru have gone through different stages in the transition towards last-
ing peace, and these distinctions are important for the SDGs and links to 
forests and land-use more broadly. Peacemaking includes processes of nego-
tiation and dialogue to shift away from violent conflict and reach a peace 
agreement. Peacekeeping usually involves military interventions that help 
transitions towards peace by separating the fighting parties and actively 
preventing violence from erupting. Peacebuilding is intended to promote 
transitions towards lasting peace by addressing the structural causes of con-
flict and strengthening the capacity of local actors to overcome conflicts 
(Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Reinstating the ‘rule of law’ and maintaining it 
(Peacekeeping and Peacemaking) are not sufficient to address long-held and 
legitimate grievances (Peacebuilding), nor do they ensure justice (Corntassel 
and Holder 2008).
Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR) worked in areas 
affected by the Shining Path to support local communities in their search 
for peace and reconciliation. A report (CVR 2003) outlining the depth of the 
conflict, the responsible parties and the long-term impacts recommended 
reparation actions. Some of these were put into law, but many have not 
been implemented. The underlying issues of inequality, land conflicts 
and structural racism towards Indigenous peoples have not been resolved 
(Corntassel and Holder 2008). This failure’s impact on forests remains to be 
studied.
In Colombia, peacebuilding approaches aim to reduce the causes of con-
flict (land-related grievances) and to curb access to resources for funding 
armed groups (e.g. coca). Castro-Nuñez et al. (2017b) found that the cur-
rent programmes underway in areas emerging from the conflict, including 
land-tenure programmes, conditional payments for production of alternative 
crops and forest conservation, are compatible with both development aims 
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and forest conservation. Clearly more research will be needed to understand 
how these programmes unfold in practice.
16.2.2 The Rule of Law, Accountability, Transparency and 
Access to Justice
The rule of law is a major focus of SDG 16, consistent with the wider trend 
in international governance to promote legality and legal enforcement 
as pathways to sustainability (McDermott 2014). This trend is particularly 
evident in the forest sector, having gained major prominence with the rise 
of illegal logging initiatives in the early 2000s. For example, the EU Forest 
Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan (EC 2003) 
has spurred a number of initiatives to eradicate illegal wood from EU sup-
ply chains, following the logic that law enforcement is a necessary stepping 
stone to good governance and sustainability (EC 2003). FLEGT mechanisms 
include the EU Timber Regulation, which prohibits the import of wood into 
the EU that was produced in violation of the laws of the country of origin (EC 
2010), and Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs) with partner countries 
in the Global South, for the development of ‘legality licensing systems’ (EC 
2005). Once these systems are in place, all wood imported into the EU from 
a partner country must bear a special ‘legality license’ that verifies the wood 
was legally produced.
This push for legality has spilled into other normative texts and strat-
egies of major relevance to forests. The New York Declaration on Forests, 
signed by 27 national governments and numerous corporations and NGOs, 
includes a claim that policies and measures to address illegal logging have 
‘proven very effective in reducing forest loss’ (UN Climate Summit 2014). No 
evidence is provided to back this statement, but its presence highlights the 
normative prominence of legality in international discourse. The harnessing 
of EU markets to demand legal verification is likewise a key recommendation 
listed in an EU-commissioned feasibility study for an action plan to com-
bat deforestation and degradation, where the scope of legality verification is 
extended to the production of agricultural crops associated with deforesta-
tion (COWI 2018).
SDG 16 couples this emphasis on the rule of law with an approach to account-
ability and transparency that prioritises the eradication of state-based corrup-
tion (Targets 16.5, 16.6). Specifically, Indicators 16.5.1 and 16.5.2 require data 
quantifying and reporting on levels of individual and corporate bribery of pub-
lic officials. This aligns, at least in part, with trends in international governance 
to promote global transparency as a means to facilitate a ‘level playing field’ 
for international trade. Such transparency is based on a principle of external 
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surveillance and control through standardisation and external monitoring, 
reporting and verification (e.g. Mutersbaugh 2005, Wood 2013). Applying a 
universalising discourse of transparency, as a taken-for-granted social good 
and antidote to corruption, assumes the existence of a functioning state with 
clear and equitable rules and an even-handed judiciary. This overlooks how 
complex patron–client relations generally arise in the absence of strong state 
institutions with widespread legitimacy (Peluso 2018), and how accusations of 
corruption are frequently harnessed for political gain (Khan 1998).
A universalising, decontextualised conception of transparency is also evi-
dent, for example, in the UNFCCC2 mechanism Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation, plus carbon stock enhancement, sus-
tainable forest management, and conservation (REDD+). REDD+ has focused 
singular attention on the monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of 
forest carbon, a single chemical element amenable to international stand-
ardisation and monetisation. The focus on carbon inevitably obscures many 
other forest values less readily measured and verified by external actors. These 
other non-carbon environmental and social concerns are subsumed under 
the REDD+ ‘safeguards’.
Sikor (2013) critiques this separation of ‘safeguards’ from the broader ‘tech-
nical’ design of REDD+, arguing that MRV and other REDD+ technologies of 
transparency themselves play a central role in shaping the distribution of 
rights and benefits. Fundamentally, the implementation of REDD+ cannot 
be separated from the broader governance contexts in which it falls, or from 
the priorities of those tasked with its enactment on the ground (Khatun et al. 
2015, Kull et al. 2015). This intersection of the global and the local has social 
impacts much less transparent and amenable to international monitoring 
than changes in forest cover. Decisions about which REDD+ safeguards can 
and should be monitored are themselves contested. REDD+ poses substantial 
risks to local communities if it generates new forms of knowledge for national 
and/or international actors which are poorly understood at local levels, yet 
may be used to restrict local access to resources.
The interplay of scale and transparency can also be observed in the con-
cept of a ‘global commons’ inherent in international climate governance. 
This claiming of space by international actors enables international regula-
tion of practices that previously had local and national provenance. Villagers 
are thus drawn into a shifting assemblage of international governance, and 
are subject to new identifications as entrepreneurs and responsible environ-
mental citizens, meant to look after the global commons. While this may 
be seen, in practice, as ‘global citizenship’, it involves citizen responsibilities 
2 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
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without corresponding rights (Arora-Jonsson et al. 2016). Meanwhile, the 
growing technical, bureaucratic and political complexity of international 
processes such as REDD+, and associated MRV, decrease their transparency 
to most global and local citizens, undermining citizens’ abilities to inde-
pendently assert whatever rights they do hold (McDermott 2014). Hence, 
incongruously, the transparency called for in initiatives such as REDD+ risks 
disempowering the people it aims to empower.
International transparency can at times strengthen the power of minor-
ity groups, particularly when those minority interests align with broader 
international norms and agendas. For example, some Indigenous groups 
have successfully aligned with international environmental or human rights 
organisations to stop the allocation of mining or other commercial conces-
sions on traditional lands (Woodman 2014). The relevant lesson for SDG 16 is 
that the effect of international demands for transparency and accountability 
on forest-dependent peoples depends on what is being made transparent and 
accountable, and to whom.
The concept of ‘justice’ articulated in SDG 16 likewise raises questions of 
justice for what and for whom. Targets 16.3 and 16.9 appear to equate justice 
with promoting the rule of law and the creation of legal identities through 
registration (Indicator 16.9.1), while also making select reference to interna-
tional human rights laws (Indicator 16.8.1). This largely bypasses the difficult 
question of how state definitions of justice inevitably privilege some actors 
and some conceptions of justice over others. In contrast, recent literature 
addressing REDD+ and other payments-for-nature schemes argue that justice, 
and associated concepts of equity, are better viewed as complex and multi-
dimensional, involving many actors both within and beyond the state, and 
inevitably requiring trade-offs. For example, McDermott et al. (2013) high-
light how equity and justice are socially constructed, and must be understood 
in the context of how they are defined and by whom, what their goals are 
and who counts as legitimate subjects of justice or equity. Likewise, they may 
involve procedural dimensions (e.g. conceptions of due process), as well as 
distributive (e.g. the fair distribution of benefits) and contextual dimensions. 
The impact on forests and people of achieving justice under the banner of 
SDG 16 will similarly depend on the degree to which SDG 16 implementation 
conceptualises and acknowledges the full assemblage of actors and institu-
tions beyond the state, and whose justice is served or undermined.
The impact of implementing SDG 16 targets that promote the rule of law, 
transparency and justice will depend on a wide range of factors, including 
pre-existing formal and informal institutions, and the scales of the actors 
and markets involved in its implementation. National forest laws in many 
countries favour political elites and/or large-scale industry actors. The focus 
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of international initiatives on international transparency may render local 
actors, and the impacts on local markets, relatively invisible or illegitimate 
(Hirons et al. 2018). Yet it is not inevitable that the implementation of SDG 16 
will simply reinforce these trends. The following case study in Ghana draws 
on the examples of FLEGT VPA and REDD+ processes to illustrate how the 
way governance is understood and approached in any given intervention can 
further entrench existing power dynamics or lead to transformative change.
CASE STUDY 16.2 A COMPARISON OF THE FLEGT VPA AND REDD+ IN GHANA
Oil, gold, cocoa, timber and agriculture are the main resources underpin-
ning the Ghanaian economy. For timber and cocoa, in particular, there are 
concerns over the impact of unsustainable timber harvest and expansion of 
low-yield cocoa into forested areas. Ghana’s timber harvest is three times the 
annual allowable cut (Hansen et al. 2012) and, coupled with the conversion 
of forest to cocoa farms, may be undermining the long-term benefits flow-
ing from intact forests, including carbon storage and sequestration and the 
provision of climatic conditions suitable for cocoa and biodiversity conserva-
tion (Benhin and Barbier 2004, Gockowski and Sonwa 2011, Government of 
Ghana 2005, Hansen et al. 2009, Obiri et al. 2007, Ruf 2011, Wade et al. 2010). 
Two international policy responses have emerged that align with these con-
cerns: FLEGT’s VPA programme and REDD+.3 This case study briefly reviews 
the development of these two strategies in Ghana, comparing key features of 
their approach to legal reform so as to illustrate differences between strategies 
that prioritise legal formalisation, auditability and enforcement (top-down) 
and those that account for customary norms and locally driven governance 
processes (bottom-up).
It has been estimated that 70 per cent of Ghana’s timber production is 
illegal (Hansen and Treue 2008). In 2009, Ghana and the EU signed a FLEGT 
VPA trade agreement to eradicate this illegality and stop the import of illegal 
wood into the EU (Beeko and Arts 2010). The agreement maintains the legal 
rights of the state over economically valuable timber, which the state may sell 
to private concessionaires. State control extends to native trees growing on 
farmlands, so that enforcing state rights effectively marginalises small-scale 
and local actors. Most farmers have no legal rights to timber growing on their 
farms, and can only access their timber through illegal harvesting.
At the heart of the VPA strategy is the idea that the legality of timber can 
be independently verified and audited. To deliver this accountability, the 
VPA established a Timber Legality Assurance System (TLAS) that includes a 
wood-tracking system (WTS) to provide an auditable chain of custody for 
3 The ‘plus’ refers to additional objectives associated with enhancing forest carbon stocks, 
enhancing biodiversity and ensuring the social component of sustainability is addressed.
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timber. The TLAS covers imports, pre-felling processes, felling and process-
ing, right through to point-of-sale. Once Ghana’s TLAS is accepted by the EU, 
timber can be sold as ‘FLEGT licensed’ (i.e. assured legality) and can thereby 
be imported into the EU. To date, Ghana’s efforts to implement the VPA have 
been focused on producing FLEGT-licensed timber for export, though no 
FLEGT licenses have been granted in Ghana so far. Well-documented concerns 
about how the current legal system in Ghana perpetuates the criminality of 
farmers harvesting trees on their own lands effectively remain unaddressed 
(Hansen et al. 2018, Hirons 2018).
In a parallel (and largely unconnected) effort, the World Bank has been 
supporting Ghana’s proposals for REDD+ under the UNFCCC to be based 
on a sustainable intensification strategy for the cocoa sector. This strategy 
includes a ‘climate-smart cocoa’ production approach focused on increas-
ing yields (productivity per unit area) through the adoption of best practices 
and recommended shade levels, combined with community-based landscape 
governance and land-use planning processes. These measures aim to reduce 
expansion pressure on forests and to incentivise maintenance and enhance-
ment of carbon stocks in the landscape (Asare 2014). The strategy’s success 
requires that cocoa farmers access critical resources and gain improved ten-
ure. Currently, farmers have little motivation to maintain shade trees because 
they lack formal rights to native trees4 and are therefore incentivised to 
remove shade trees to minimise the risk that the government will allocate the 
native trees on their farms to timber concessionaires, who will damage cocoa5 
when they remove the trees. Although there are legal provisions for farmers 
to be compensated for damage to their cocoa plants and for community ben-
efits to be provided through Social Responsibility Agreements, these are often 
ignored, and the majority of benefits are captured by local elites.
In light of these dynamics, the REDD+ process in Ghana prioritises tree-
tenure reform (Asare 2014) that would enshrine the customary norms and 
rights characterising much of the local decision-making on farms. This would 
allow farmers to negotiate their own agreements with local authorities con-
cerning the harvest and sale of trees on their farms.6 These reforms could be 
4 A policy reform in 2002 resulted in the amendment of the Timber Resource Management 
Act 547 to Act 617. The amended Act 617 makes provision for granting ownership rights 
to individuals who plant timber trees on farmlands. However, these rights do not apply to 
naturally regenerating trees, and if farmers plant native trees it is difficult for them to prove 
that they were planted and not naturally recurring.
5 Timber contractors use heavy machinery to drag whole trees out of farms, damaging cocoa 
trees in the process. Chainsaw operators ‘slice’ the trees where they are felled and the lumber is 
carried out by hand, which is considerably less damaging to cocoa.
6 Government revenues under a reformed tenure system would be provided for by taxation in 
markets, rather than stumpage fees, which are not collected by the state when felling is illegal.
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tested and refined under existing proposals, such as the community resource 
management area (CREMA) mechanism, which authorises communities to 
manage their own resources. Monitoring would be largely based on indicators 
reflecting the CREMA development and management process; CREMA would 
report on outcomes to partner entities. This locally tailored approach con-
trasts with standardised international systems that focus on external moni-
toring and control. The CREMA approach potentially delivers greater rights 
to communities in managing the resources they steward and greater propor-
tions of the associated benefits.
These two major forest policy initiatives in Ghana have contrasting 
approaches to governance and legal reform. The FLEGT VPA focuses on state 
control over forest resources and emphasises auditability and enforcement 
while the tree-tenure reforms under REDD+ propose to incorporate custom-
ary norms into statutory law. These two approaches have markedly different 
impacts on local groups. Under FLEGT, the local domestic producers and con-
sumers of timber risk further criminalisation and exclusion from the benefits 
of timber harvest as a livelihood activity (Hansen et al. 2018, Hirons et al. 
2018). Under REDD+, proposals for tree tenure improve local actors’ ability to 
control and benefit from trees on their land (Asare 2014).
This characterisation of the difference between FLEGT and REDD+ in 
Ghana is somewhat simplified.7 The findings also cannot, by themselves, be 
generalised to other country contexts. The intent here is to illustrate how the 
assumed links between legality and sustainability should be more critically 
and deeply investigated. Forest laws can be legal yet ecologically unsustain-
able and socially inequitable; illegal production can be both sustainable and 
fair. Approaches to legal reform that attempt to incorporate the informal rules 
and norms underpinning sustainable resource management are more likely 
to support the wider objectives outlined in the SDGs than those that benefit 
large private entities and states at the cost of marginalising and criminalising 
local actors.
16.2.3 Inclusiveness and Participation
Target 16.7 calls for ‘responsive, inclusive, participatory and representa-
tive decision-making at all levels’. Like the previous themes, the indicators 
under this target strongly imply a focus on state institutions and national-
level reporting. Trends in international discourse on governance encompass a 
much broader and more far-reaching understanding of participation. For the 
forest sector this means a push towards decentralisation in forest governance 
7 For example, tree-tenure reform has also been mooted during FLEGT discussions, but it is 
REDD+ that is leading the way on current efforts on this issue.
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across levels of government, as well as the active involvement of non-state 
actors and local communities in decision-making (Arts 2014, Gilmour 2016).
In many parts of the world more participatory approaches to forest man-
agement have been formalised through community-based or collaborative 
forest management. It is estimated that in 62 countries, covering 65 per cent 
of the world’s forests, 28 per cent of the forest area is community managed 
(Gilmour 2016). Under such arrangements, forest users are often required 
to set up a decision-making structure, usually based on elected community 
representation, such as a forest-user group or committee, with a mandate and 
functions prescribed in legislation. In practice, these initiatives are mostly 
‘top-down’, unlike some customary and Indigenous governance systems 
which in some cases are rooted in centuries of traditional practice. While 
state-regulated arrangements provide opportunities for forest users to partici-
pate in forest management in ways that are recognised and supported by the 
state, the governance structures and systems may either conflict with existing 
customary practice or reinforce inequities, thereby falling short of fully inclu-
sive or representative decision-making. It is often the case within communi-
ties that elites – those with higher status, power and/or wealth – dominate 
formal community management and co-management systems at the local 
level, steering decisions and capturing benefits.
Given sufficient time and investment, state-orchestrated participation can 
offer opportunity for non-elites to challenge this elite capture. For exam-
ple, Lund and Saito-Jensen (2013), in their study of participatory forestry in 
Tanzania and India over more than a decade, observe that over time margin-
alised people successfully organised themselves and formed alliances with 
external actors to resist elite control, and made use of electoral systems to 
gain increased authority. Likewise, Persha and Andersson (2014) find that the 
involvement of external agencies, such as NGOs, can help to reduce the scale 
and negative effects of elite capture.
Research on the opportunities for women to be part of participatory for-
est structures and processes has, for example, examined which factors enable 
and constrain women’s participation and whether women’s presence has any 
impact on the nature and effectiveness of forest management. Agarwal (2009, 
2010) finds that women’s participation in community forest institutions in 
India and Nepal often led to stricter rules, though other factors can also be at 
play. Coleman and Mwangi (2013) find that women from households with 
higher levels of education and wealth are more likely to be influential par-
ticipants in community forestry. Arora-Jonsson (2014) argues that the man-
datory presence of women in forest committees may simply rubber-stamp 
legitimacy to external actors without changing the status quo. Women have 
gained greater influence over decision-making by organising women’s groups 
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outside of mainstream institutions. Arora-Jonsson advocates for acknowledg-
ing the multiple spaces in which everyday decision-making on the forests 
actually takes place, including informal types of social organisation (e.g. 
informal village groups tasked with keeping forests and villages clean, fetch-
ing water, planting herbs in the forest) that are frequently overlooked by 
external actors and researchers (Arora-Jonsson 2009).
Regarding the overall impacts of formal participatory forest processes, there 
is some evidence of positive outcomes for forest cover (Bowler et al. 2012, 
Gilmour 2016), but inadequate evidence of improved livelihoods (Samii et al. 
2015). Bowler et al. (2012) call for capacity for evaluation to be built into 
participatory forest management programmes. An FAO review of 40 years 
of community-based forestry8 identifies the following as key challenges for 
sustainable forest management: (1) the adoption of such approaches tends 
to be found in highly degraded forests that offer little in the way of benefits 
to communities; (2) communities are often not granted access to valuable 
resources, particularly timber; (3) the emphasis is on protection rather than 
management; and (4) decision-making power largely remains with the central 
government (Gilmour 2016). This reflects what has happened with decen-
tralisation more generally, where the majority of decision-making power and 
resources remain with central government. These patterns continue, despite 
widespread recognition of the need for participation to be meaningful, inclu-
sive and equitable (Nunan et al. 2018). Additionally, studies of participatory 
forest management tend to focus on cases where external actors are involved 
in conceptualising, implementing or supporting community forest activities. 
A myriad of traditional, community-based management strategies are often 
not included in these reviews or impact studies.
The meaningful inclusion of local communities in resource management 
depends on the strength of their underlying land tenure and use rights, and 
their capacity to benefit from those rights (Ribot and Peluso 2003). Multi-
country synthesis studies of research on community forestry reiterate the 
importance of the bundles of rights communities have to land and resources, 
including the material benefit from forests (Baynes et al. 2015, Gnych et al. 
2018). These overarching issues of rights and access are notably absent from 
SDG 16 targets and indicators.
The following case studies serve to situate these challenges to participatory 
forest management in specific country contexts. Case Study 16.3 illustrates 
Indonesia’s high levels of ambition and investment in community forestry, 
8 The literature varies on the definitions and terms used to refer to participatory approaches 
to forest management. Our focus here is deliberately broad, and encompasses a range of 
practices which include community-based forestry, participatory forest management and other 
associated frames.
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as well as the many challenges and trade-offs faced in realising that ambition. 
Case Study 16.4 provides a comparative case study of Sweden and India that 
challenges commonly held assumptions about the relative quality of partici-
pation in the Global North and South.
CASE STUDY 16.3 INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION IN INDONESIA’S SOCIAL FORESTRY 
INITIATIVE
Around 91 per cent of Indonesia’s forested areas are administered by the state, 
and communities in an estimated 31 957 villages in and around forest areas 
lack secure access to forests and livelihoods (RRI 2013). In recognition of this, 
the government of Indonesia has recently spearheaded a major push towards 
social forestry, with an ambitious target to allocate 12.7 million ha of forest 
area to local and Indigenous communities by 2019, as stipulated by a series 
of social forestry policies.9 These policies have the triple objectives of secur-
ing communities’ access to forest resources, alleviating poverty and improv-
ing forest conditions. This landmark decision has been praised by many as a 
promising pathway for more inclusive and equitable development. It is also 
hoped it will clarify forest tenure, and resolve widespread and longstanding 
forest tenure conflicts (Eghenterr et al. 2017).
A core procedural mechanism for Indonesia’s social forestry strategy has 
been to engage a diversity of stakeholders in social forestry working groups 
at the national and provincial levels. These groups currently cover 24 out 
of 34 provinces and engage 1118 individuals as focal points (Social Forestry 
Working Group 2017). The working groups are intended to facilitate the 
development and implementation of social forestry policies and stimulate 
the achievement of social forestry targets through preparing and updating 
digital maps to determine targeted priority areas,10 as well as to carry out 
capacity-building activities and support communities with permit applica-
tions and permit verification processes. To speed up the achievement of the 
social forestry target, in 2016 the government issued an integrated social 
forestry policy that is expected to simplify procedures to obtain a permit, 
thereby reducing the time it takes from up to several years to a maximum of 
three months.
 9 Under social forestry policies, communities will be able to apply permits to manage the 
‘state forests’ through several schemes: (a) community forestry (hutan kemasyarakatan); (b) 
village forests (hutan desa); (c) community plantation forests (hutan tanaman rakyat); (d) 
customary forests (hutan adat) and (e) forming partnership with private sectors (kemitraan 
kehutanan). Unlike other social forestry schemes, which only provide communities with rights 
to access forest resources, adat forest allows communities to have ownership rights over their 
customary forests. This was made possible by a constitutional court ruling that stipulates 
adat forests should no longer be considered part of state forests.
10 Peta Persiapan Perhutanan Sosial or a preparation map for social forestry target.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108765015
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. SLU Library, on 10 Jan 2020 at 15:10:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
SDG 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions 
529
Nevertheless, progress in reaching targets has been slow relative to ambi-
tions, with a total of 1 065 056 ha reported as designated in September 2017 
(MoEF 2017). The recognition of customary (adat) forests has been slower still 
(Myers et al. 2017). Out of the 9.1 million ha identified as adat forest in a map 
prepared by the National Indigenous People’s Alliance of the Archipelago 
(AMAN), only 17 092  ha have been recognised by the state (Arumingtyas 
2018). This slow progress is due, in part, to long and arduous government 
procedures, and overlapping claims over forestlands (Arumingtyas 2018, 
HUMA 2015).
While Indonesia’s social forestry policies emphasise seemingly inclusion-
ary politics, their implementation shows various forms of exclusion that 
could limit Indigenous and local communities’ ability to benefit from forest 
resources. Despite inclusive processes at the national and provincial levels, 
Indigenous and local communities are at risk of being minimally involved 
at the village level due to the rush to achieved targeted hectares allocated 
for social forestry schemes. Field observations of social forestry policy imple-
mentation in several sites in Central Kalimantan suggest that local and 
Indigenous communities are minimally engaged in the issuance of social for-
estry permits. In the haste to issue permits to meet ambitious targets, and 
given the complexity of the permitting process, many members of communi-
ties holding such permits lack awareness of the rights and responsibilities the 
permits entail.11 Some community members consider the permits additional 
burdens if the forestlands allocated to them are neither productive nor easily 
accessible. There is also evidence of elite capture (Maryudi et al. 2012), and/
or the exclusion of women from forest decision-making processes and forest 
benefits (Setyowati 2012). Other forest-user groups remain excluded from the 
process entirely, including transmigrant communities, or communities mak-
ing claims to lands allocated to company concessions or conservation areas, 
or to lands that have been removed from the category of state forestlands 
(Myers et al. 2017).
With the exception of adat forests, forest tenure reform in the social 
forestry policies refers to allocating usufruct rights to communities while 
retaining the state’s ownership over the forestlands. Most of the legal rights 
stipulated in the forestry policies are time bound and come with use restric-
tions based on the classification of the allocated forest (Moeliono et al. 2017). 
For instance, a social forestry permit stipulated in a protected forest (hutan 
lindung) requires communities to improve forest protection and only allows 
the use of non-timber forest products. Moreover, the allocation is conditional 
11 Informal discussion with villagers on the community forest plantation permit (HTR), Pulang 
Pisau District, Central Kalimantan, November 2016.
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on fulfilling responsibilities that communities often find difficult, such as 
submitting management plans and managing the forest in accordance with 
particular technical requirements. In a recent social forestry scheme which 
specifically targeted forest areas in Java, controlled by the state-owned enter-
prise, only severely degraded forest areas in need of rehabilitation could be 
allocated to communities.12 Without sufficient technical and budgetary sup-
port, such allocations, rather than improving local development, limit local 
economic aspirations and further marginalise local communities.
CASE STUDY 16.4 THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLITICS OF PARTICIPATION IN 
SWEDEN
Seema Arora-Jonsson’s work (2018) challenges the discourse of international 
development that paints the Global North as a referent for democracy and 
public participation, and the Global South as in need of Northern assistance 
and capacity-building to achieve conformity with Northern ideals. She illus-
trates this argument through case studies of Sweden as both a domestic and 
an international actor, contrasting Sweden’s domestic and international poli-
cies regarding democratic decision-making in environmental governance 
(2018).
She points to the 1990s as an era that institutionalised international norms 
of decentralisation, embedded, in part, in a neoliberal agenda to shift envi-
ronmental responsibility to local groups and individuals (Arora-Jonsson 
2017). Within this trend, Sweden played a leading role in highlighting the 
importance of people’s participation in decision-making, as well as serving 
as an international champion for gender equality. Gender forms a central 
theme and a priority for the Swedish Development Agency (Sida) and Sida 
was instrumental in supporting the World Bank to make participation of dif-
ferent groups central to questions of development aid. This contrasts with the 
relative absence of the mention of people’s participation in environmental 
policy-making within Sweden, including few requirements for government 
workers to employ a gender perspective.
Her comparative case studies of two forest communities, in India and 
Sweden, likewise illustrate the disconnect between Sweden’s international 
image as a gender champion and its local realities in forestry decision-making. 
In the Nayagarh district in Odisha, India, the openly acknowledged gender 
differences voiced by local actors, with support from NGOs and international 
actors, legitimised the formation of women’s groups and collective action to 
address women’s priorities. In contrast, in the village of Drevdagen in west-
ern Sweden, cultural perceptions of Sweden as a highly developed, modern 
12 MoEF Decree No.39/2017 on Social Forestry Schemes in Perum Perhutani Area.
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country with strong norms of gender equality served to diminish the col-
lective voice of women. In such a context, complaints of female oppression 
could be written off as signs of the weakness of individual women who have 
failed to assert themselves socially, or as an aberration in a country assumed 
to be gender-equal, rather than a reflection of broader societal discrimination 
(Arora-Jonsson 2009).
16.3 Conclusion
Understanding SDG 16 from a political ecology perspective requires atten-
tion to how states and other actors exercise their power in interpreting and 
implementing the SDGs. These dynamics are influenced by a range of larger 
governance trends, as well as by complex local particularities. States form the 
core authority behind the SDGs and are responsible for reporting on indica-
tors, which at least partially explains why the language of SDG 16 places 
such a strong emphasis on state institutions. However, an understanding of 
governance as multi-nodal, networked and contested makes it impossible to 
ignore how reinforcing state power may undermine other governance institu-
tions, such as traditional and local authorities.
In order to examine these issues, this chapter focuses on three different 
thematic areas encapsulated in SDG 16 – peace, justice and participation – to 
identify what existing literature can tell us about how SDG 16 implementa-
tion might impact forests and people. These analyses have also been grounded 
in more specific case studies to further unpack associated opportunities and 
challenges.
In regards to peace, our findings illustrate how peace cannot be separated 
from the broader context of environmental and social welfare. While SDG 
16 emphasises the state’s role as enforcer of the peace, an over-reliance on 
state actors to quell violence and promote peace can, in some contexts, have 
negative environmental and social outcomes, including the assertion of state 
control through the conversion of forests into commercial agriculture and/
or repression of political dissent. The literature reveals varying effects of 
armed conflict on forest cover, resulting in either a net gain or loss of cover. 
This variation is observed both within and between countries, as witnessed 
in Case Study 16.1 on Colombia and Peru. Post-conflict periods are often 
associated with forest loss, through state-sponsored settlement schemes and 
other forms of securitisation of frontier areas, as well as the expansion of 
agricultural land and resource extraction fuelled by economic recovery and 
growth.
Regarding the second SDG theme – the rule of law, accountability, trans-
parency, and access to justice – the impacts on forests and people of realising 
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these goals will depend on a wide range of contextual factors, including pre-
existing formal and informal institutions, and the scales of the actors and 
markets involved. National laws governing forests and land use in many 
countries favour political elite and/or large-scale industry actors, as do gov-
ernment policies encouraging commercial expansion into forest frontiers. 
Law enforcement without legal and policy reforms to dis-incentivise land 
conversion and to improve local resource rights and benefit capture could 
drive forest loss and the displacement of local communities. Furthermore, the 
focus of international initiatives on international transparency may legiti-
mise large producers and industries based on their ability to control and track 
their supply chains, while rendering local actors, local markets and local live-
lihoods illegitimate or invisible (Scott 1998). This could further disempower 
rural communities and undermine their access to natural resources, while 
contributing to increased urban and international commodity consumption. 
Nevertheless, in some cases local actors may leverage international attention 
to successfully defend their interests against the state, particularly if their 
cause is aligned with international norms and agendas.
It is not inevitable that the implementation of SDG 16 will reinforce exist-
ing inequities. As illustrated by Case Study 16.2 of the FLEGT VPA and REDD+ 
in Ghana, the way in which governance is understood and approached in 
any given intervention can either further entrench existing power dynamics 
or lead to more transformative change. Approaches to legal reform which 
recognise the informal rules and norms underpinning sustainable resource 
management are more likely to support the wider SDG objectives than 
approaches that reinforce state laws designed to benefit large private entities 
and states.
Our analysis of the third theme – inclusiveness and participation – high-
lights the prevalence of the concept in international discourse and the 
diversity of ways in which it has been operationalised in the forest sector. 
These include the legal recognition of some form of community control over 
increasing areas of the world’s forests. As highlighted in the Indonesian case, 
participation is time-consuming, costly and contentious. It can become more 
burdensome than empowering if it is accompanied by increasing account-
ability demands from states and other actors, and if these demands are not 
balanced with adequate benefits. Ambitious targets dictated at national or 
international levels to hand over forests to communities can overwhelm 
capacities for meaningful implementation.
The Swedish case unpacks the stereotypes of the Global North as the ref-
erential role model of democracy and participation for the Global South. 
Assumptions about Sweden as a developed country that has solved partici-
pation issues through formal legal means preclude attention to questions of 
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participation and gender in resource decision-making on the ground. By con-
trasting Swedish policies at home and abroad, Arora-Jonsson (2009, 2018) 
deconstructs the development divide – the modern state in the Global North 
versus the not-quite modern state in the Global South – and how this might 
be used to further particular interests in either place. All the SDGs aim to 
motivate countries to self-assess and improve their efforts to reach common 
goals; this may open up the space for debating these important transnational 
relationships.
SDG 16 reflects international agreement on the importance of participatory 
processes and local decision-making. In the context of forests, this means rec-
ognising that forest use, management and governance can fail some people, 
and that long-term solutions to social and environmental problems, while 
global in scope, may result in local injustices. Furthermore, current research 
indicates that the heavily state-centric focus of the SDG 16 targets and indica-
tors as a means to achieve good governance risks reinforcing these injustices. 
This suggests that SDG 16 may best be served through greater acknowledge-
ment of non-state actors and institutions at multiple scales – from traditional 
governance systems to global-scale initiatives – and adjusting the appropriate 
mix of governance approaches to individual national, sub-national and local 
contexts. This also argues against a heavy focus on the standardised, quanti-
tative metrics associated with SDG 16’s reporting requirements. Instead, what 
is needed are placed-based assessments of the power dynamics of particular 
governance systems, and the identification of actions to address inequities in 
ways that are locally and contextually appropriate.
While the achievement of a truly inclusive and sustainable development, 
with justice for all and at all levels, is a laudable goal, it must not obscure the 
inevitable trade-offs inherent in governance, and, indeed, in the very concept 
of equity. It is critical to keep a power-informed perspective in the imple-
mentation of SDG 16 that acknowledges these trade-offs and leaves room 
for healthy conflicts and struggles among state and non-state actors alike. 
Creating adequate space for conflict and dispute is integral to the pursuit of 
individual and social welfare, peace and fulfilment.
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